Why cross the 38th parallel

In many ways the stage for this war had been set in the late s, with the industrial and military ascendance of Japan. The Japanese pressed as many as , men into their army, and they forced about the same number of women to become sex partners for Japanese soldiers. American military leaders overseeing the orderly surrender of Japanese forces in Korea had little time to reach agreements with the Soviets.

Two U. Army colonels temporarily attached to the State Department were dispatched to Korea to find a dividing line. They suggested occupation zones, modeled on the arrangement in Germany after its surrender in The colonels consulted a National Geographic map and focused on the 38th parallel, a degree of latitude north of the equator, passing through the middle of the Korean peninsula. The 38th parallel followed no river or mountain range.

It went indifferently through farms and villages, roads, and railroad lines. The colonels recommended to Truman that the parallel separate the two zones. Truman offered the idea to the Soviets, and they accepted. Korea was split into the communist north and the democratic south. Thirty million Koreans would be affected, but not a single one of them had a say. Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and historian David Halberstam wrote that after Truman committed troops, he sought to downplay the conflict by calling it a police action.

In the new Cold War, he needed to avoid confronting Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, the only other world leader beside himself with atomic weapons. His troops drove past the 38th parallel into the Republic of Korea with a swiftness reminiscent of the German invasion of France a decade earlier. South Korea then put its army under the jurisdiction of the United Nations. The United States supported a U. Walker nonetheless was convinced by 7 October that it was time to move.

Since MacArthur's order for the attack to the north had not designated a beginning date for the Eighth Army advance and since Walker had had no word since the initial order on 2 October, he directed his chief of staff, Maj.

Leven C. Allen, to get in touch with Tokyo and find out what was wanted. Allen asked for and received immediate confirmation of this by radio. Two days later, on 9 October, Walker notified MacArthur that he had ordered his commanders to strike out for P'yongyang without delay. Appleman with Gen. Hickey Tokyo with Gen. Allen Korea , , 7 Oct. Also on 9 October, basing his action on the new U.

But he warned that unless he got an immediate agreement from the North Korean Government, "I shall at once proceed to take such military ac-. Information on North Korean activities north of the parallel had already convinced the Eighth Army that hard fighting awaited on the road to P'yongyang. ROK intelligence agents described extensive North Korean fortifications and other defensive preparations, including the moving up of new units of fresh troops who had not fought in South Korea.

In the U. I Corps zone, patrols from the U. The attackers encountered prolonged and fierce resistance at Kumch'on, but on 14 October they seized that battered town and by 16 October the enemy front lines ceased to exist.

Map III. The progress of the two divisions of the ROK I Corps along the east coast of Korea was even faster, and at times spectacular.

Although enemy resistance appears to have been lighter in the area, the ROK advance nevertheless reflected a creditable offensive spirit. These troops later turned to guerrilla warfare and proved an annoying, even dangerous, thorn in the side of U. Is KMAG under our control and logistic support? We would like to know if we can organize the ROK Army itself. They are to be considered as members of the team and working with the team in whatever area they may be employed.

General Walker flew into the city on the day of its capture. He was so impressed by the ROK's successes that he tacitly established his own plan for cutting a line across Korea from P'yongyang to Wonsan.

The ROK forces seemed to be in a position to carry out the original mission assigned to X Corps, advancing along the Wonsan-P'yongyang axis to link up with other Eighth Army forces and sealing off Korea to that line. He had directed his planners to modify plans for Almond's landing and to prepare for a possible landing by the Marines at Hungnam instead of Wonsan. The 7th Division would land administratively a few miles north of Wonsan, then strike out overhand for P'yongyang.

The Marines, in the meantime, from their base at Hungnam would head toward P'yongyang also. This plan pointed. After reviewing the plan, General MacArthur called in Admiral Joy, pointed out that ROK units were even then approaching Wonsan, and told him that he was considering this alternative method of landing. Joy strongly opposed the change. He pointed to the great disadvantages of splitting the two forces, the lack of time for detailed naval planning, and the impracticability of clearing both Wonsan and Hungnam harbors of mines in the short time left before the landing was to take place.

General MacArthur accepted Joy's views, gave up the idea of changing landing places, and on 10 October ordered all major commanders to carry out the original plan as scheduled. General MacArthur had no intention of leaving X Corps out of the operations. He made this very clear to Walker, removing any delusions that Eighth Army was going to expand its mission.

He told him that the Navy would continue its sweeping operations to remove mines from Wonsan Harbor and would maintain its gunfire and air support of ROK divisions. At the close of September, at X Corps headquarters in Ascom City near Inch'on, General Almond briefed his division commanders and principal staff officers on the coming amphibious operation.

General Smith, commanding the 1st Marine Division, viewed the plan skeptically especially the concept of marching westward across the peninsula to contact Eighth Army. These enemy troops had faded into the central mountains and were making their way north to a sanctuary somewhere in North Korea. In a drive across the central mountain range, the protection of the MSR would present a serious problem, as the drift of the North Koreans would be across the MSR.

The 1st Marine Division, scheduled to assault the Wonsan beaches, began assembling in the Inch'on area on 4 October. By 7 October, the division and a regiment of South Korean marines moved into staging areas at Inch'on and on 9 October began boarding ship for the mile sea voyage to Wonsan.

The other major component of the X Corps, the U. Several times during the long trip, groups of bypassed enemy soldiers attacked the column, but were beaten off. The leading regiment of the 7th Division reached Pusan on 10 October.

By the 12th, all units were in their Pusan assembly areas; and on 16 and 17 October, the division boarded ship. Thus, General Walker was responsible for supplying the X Corps without having any control over the corps' operations.

This arrangement added confusion and misunderstanding to an already unusual relationship between the two major commands. Mac-Arthur may have felt that Almond's extremely tight time schedule in preparing for the amphibious move, the general dislocation of Almond's forces during the transfer of divisions, and the weaknesses inherent in corps logistical facilities as compared to an army, justified saddling Walker with this additional responsibility.

Too, there was reason to believe that the Wonsan operation would be completed within a matter of weeks, thus rendering Walker's obligation a temporary measure of short duration. While the loading of X Corps ran its course, other developments in the objective area threatened even more directly than supply and shipping problems to wreck the entire landing operation. The enemy had mined Wonsan Harbor and all its approaches.

Navy had discovered enemy mines in Korean waters as early as 4 September. Operations at Inch'on had been somewhat hampered by contact mines laid in the entrance channel. Magnetic mines had also been discovered but, fortunately, ashore. Between 26 September and 2 October five U. You must be logged in to post a comment. George C. Marshall Foundation Home.

Dennis D. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. Russell D. Robert J. James I. John J. William Whitney Stueck, Jr. Michael J.